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With “The Israeli Settler Movement: Assessing and Explaining Social Movement Success” Sivan Hirsch-
Hoefler and Cass Mudde officially enter the kaleidoscopic and fascinating world of Social Movement Studies. 
Hirsch-Hoefler's knowledge of the Israeli far-right has evidently enriched the whole contribution: too much 
research on non-western social movements tends to de-historicize and take these movements out of their 
geopolitical context making these studies mere theory-testing exercises that do not enrich Social Movement 
Theory as a whole. Showing how the Israeli settler movement can be heterogeneous and multifaceted in its 
ideological convictions strategies and repertoires - although with a very clear and shared aim: annexing as 
Palestinian Territories as possible - is something remarkable that had not yet been done (not too surprising 
though, considering how hard is to enter these communities). The authors use organizational heterogeneity to 
show how the movement acted with different repertoires in different public spheres. This finding is very timing 
and interesting, in fact, working in synch at different operational levels through a sort of “company structure-
organization” is arguably one of the reasons behind the movement favourable outcomes, although, as it will 
be stressed later, structural reasons seem to be predominant in explaining the movement’s successes. The 
authors have filled an important gap in the literature on the far-right social movements: the Israeli Settler 
Movement had never been addressed from a perspective of social movement studies.  
The book is organized into seven chapters that will be here reviewed from a critical perspective of the social 
movement theory scholarship. The first chapter outlines the authors’ theoretical framework that they describe 
as «comprehensive and original». Their main argument is summarised in these lines: «We argue that political 
success of social movements is multifaceted, encompassing policies resources, and support, and is best 
analyzed through the individual contributions of the three essentially separate but intimately connected 
branches of a social movement (institutions, networks, and influencers), each of which specializes in a specific 
repertoire of actions (combining moderate, radical, or extreme actions) and targets specific political arenas 
(state, civil society, and society at both the national and international levels)» (p. 6).  The literature usually 
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group them under three main labels: Political (Amenta, Andrews, & Neal, 2019), Biographical (Passy & 
Monsch, 2019) and Cultural (Amenta & Polletta, 2019; Giuni, 2008). The authors defined success in terms of 
1) policy gains and changes (political outcome); 2) resources gained by the movement; 3) support. Leaving 
aside the normative connotation implicit in the term success1 that usually makes prefer the term outcome or 
social movement consequences, the differentiation proposed by the authors is convincing. These three 
outcomes are very important for any social movement that want to affirm itself. However, how much these 
three outcomes are tailored on the movement in question? The settler movement has always overtly pursued 
exactly these three outcomes – just like the Zionist movement of the late nineteenth century. Hence, how much 
are they the result of the movement strategies and tools instead of a mere result of the specific political system 
they are socialized in? Is this set of outcomes replicable in a context different from the Israeli one and not that 
favourable? It seems that the authors do not entirely disentangle this aspect. The authors’ analytical framework 
can be synthetized as an approach that largely builds upon two notorious social movement theories, namely, 
the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) and the Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT), and tries to evaluate 
the movement’s success by integrating these two structural theories with a meso-level of analysis that keeps 
into account the movement’s components – institutions, civil society organizations and influencers – as well. 
They investigate how all these different levels of political influences interact through various repertoires of 
action to reach the three main movement’s goals: policy gain, resources and support.  
As for the  “multifaceted” feature of social movement outcomes, this has been largely studied by Lorenzo 
Bosi (2016) and others who looked at how different types of social movement outcomes mutually influence 
one another shifting the focus from single outcomes to the interaction between different types of effects (Bosi, 
Giugni, & Uba, 2016). Hirsch-Hoefler and Mudde, however, make a step further and distinguish between 
different movement’s branches, their repertoire of actions and the political arenas they operate in (Jasper, 
2015). The authors’ merit is certainly the one of going through these different levels of influence of the 
movement (the institutional, civil society, and opinion leaders’ level) in a very accurate and articulate way. 
Nevertheless, how they frame and label these levels of action is perhaps not entirely convincing. In their 
theoretical framework, they divide between the centralized branch (institutions), the decentralized branch 
(networks), and the individual branch (influencers). The first two – institutions and civil-society networks – 
are fundamental. The Israeli settlers’ movement, as the authors recognize in chapter 3, was very successful in 
integrating in the Israeli institutional system through the Yesha Council2, the COGAT3 and other representative 
bodies. The same is true for civil society organizations: they all do incredible work on the ground to strengthen 
the movement’s grassroots bases. What is probably slightly less convincing is the figure of “influencers”. In 
the theoretical framework, influencers are described as people «who can be members of groups or 
organizations within the other two branches but whose actions are primarily individual and their relevance is 
based on their own personal reputation rather than that of the group(s) they belong to – one can think of 
athletes, intellectuals, movie stars, pundits, singers, and so on» (p.11). However in chapter five they state: 
«Individual influencers are not linked to movement organizations, whether formal or informal, but are single 
individual or small groups of people working directly or indirectly to spread the message if the settler 
 
1 Success for whom? Certainly not for the Palestinians and the International Community - who have deemed settlements 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) illegal for international law - and certainly not for the peace process in 
general. 
2«The Yesha Council has a formal and legal structure with an elected chair, a spokesperson, and a regular budget. While 
sharing the same ideological vision, the Council is characterized by favoring practicality and pragmatism over the 
ideological fervor that was the hallmark of Gush Emunim» (p.76).  
3 «Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories operates as a civilian operation, but sits under the command 
of the military authority in the West Bank»(p.57). It is a unit in the Israeli Ministry of Defense that engages in 








movement» (p.160). The two statements contradict themselves, either influencers are linked to the movement 
organizations – as some of the people they name are – or they are not, however, the problem is not that much 
in having a broad an overreaching concept of influencers, but that they mean different things and this has 
analytical consequences. Can they be considered “proper” influencers when they are part of the movement 
institutions and networks? According to the network theory, these actors may be considered as an integral part 
of the network as a whole, maybe as brokers or gatekeepers who have more power and are more influential, 
hence, they can both influence the decision-making process within the movement and playing an important 
role outside it, when their connections and ties can reach other arenas (Diani, 1997; 2000; 2003). However, do 
they play the same role as those actors, athletes, and singers who are not directly linked to the movement? 
Probably not. It might be analytically important to make this distinction clearer. Perhaps, an opinion 
leader/influencer who is not seen as directly linked to the settler movement might be seen as more 
“independent” and his/her positions considered less biased and more neutral by a more moderate and undecided 
audience who do not have a clear idea on settlers. Finally, when the authors make concrete examples of who 
they consider as influencers they list public figures such as Emily Amrousi, former Yesha Council 
spokeswoman (p.84) – a very important figure within the settler network -  and Amit Segal (son of Hagai Segal 
member of Jewish Underground, a convicted terrorist who planned and planted a bomb that blew off the leg 
of a Palestinian mayor), who was born in a settlement. On the other hand, in chapter 5, there is the example of 
Naomi Shemer – a pivotal figure of Hebrew song – an outspoken supporter of the Gush Emunim movement 
and the Jewish settlers in the territories who was also very closed to the movement but who has never formally 
joined. Are they part of the settlers’ network, as their personal histories and roles within the movement would 
tend to suggest, or are they independent public figures who “autonomously” expressed opinions in favourof 
the settlers’ movement? Setting the boundaries of the influencers category in advance through a more accurate 
framework would have probably enriched this concept’s explanatory capacity.  
The authors proceed in their theoretical framework by identifying the movement’s repertoires of action. As 
for other social movements, the repertoire of action of the radical right emerged as diverse and multiple (Caiani, 
Donatella, & Wagemann, 2012, p. 209). The division between moderate repertoires (legal/non-violent do exist 
legal violent repertoires?), radical action (illegal/non-violent), and extreme (illegal/violent). This very 
informative categorization (p.16) does not fit with the other explanatory categories as shown by Table 1.1. In 
this last part of the theoretical framework (p.38), it is not clear whether the different variables/categories are 
associated with the others on the same line or they were put randomly to show all the elements that compose 
the authors’ theoretical framework. Indeed, while Policies are certainly pursued by the movement’s 
Institutional bodies, in a Moderate way with the State political arena, Society’s Support is rarely reached 










Chapter 2 accurately retraces the history of the settlements from the 1967s six-day war until today. The 
authors successfully stress the public opinion debate and division on the settlements across the green line and 
the Israeli government’s clear willingness to legitimate formally and informally the construction of Jewish 
outposts in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). The Israeli government has always supported the 
settlers’ endeavour with direct measures and funding regardless of the political color of the government in 
charge: «All the Israeli governments supported settlement activity, whatever their political persuasion. With 
the rise of the Likud governments, however, settlements were established over a broader territory, including 
areas with dense Palestinian settlement» (p. 52).   
Equally meticulous is the description of the different movement’s branches of Chapter 3. It clearly shows 
how heterogeneous the movement is both from an ideological and tactical perspective. The authors 
differentiate among different groups of settlers: ideological (both nationalist and religious who have strong 
ideological convictions), quality of life settlers (those who moved to the settlements because of state financial 
incentives and more affordable mortgages), and ultraorthodox settlers. The description they provide of the 
settlers population is extremely interesting showing great knowledge and awareness of the movement: the 
authors are able to present a comprehensive picture of the movement making meaningful differences between 
the types of settlers (p.71). They also provide very interesting data concerning their political orientation: 92 
percent of settlers voted right-wing party in 2013; some of them, such as the post-Mamlachti – although they 
represent a small minority – rejects state authority; the movement mainly rely on a moderate repertoire of 
actions such as lobbying and legal actions; and it has branches that encompass many different arenas (the 
public opinion, the military, civil society organizations, institutional bodies and international lobby where the 
pro-Israel lobby in “has successfully pushed the perception of common interests between Israel and the United 
States and the promotion of US policy toward that end”(p.59). The settler movements effectively managed to 
place its supporters in many key positions, most recently, Naftali Bennett an outspoken pro-settlers figure who 
opposed the 2010 settlement freeze while he was director of the Yesha Council and who proposed on several 
occasions to carry out the annexation of Area C of the West Bank, is now the new Israeli Prime minister. The 
authors also clearly underlined the more recent tendency to appoint to higher positions of the IDF Jewish Israeli 
citizens coming from the settlements. The IDF has always churned out the country leadership and this may 
already indicate which will be the country’s future position on the settlements. 
Chapter 4 assesses the settler movement’s success. As Hirsch-Hoefler and Mudde underline, the movement 
has enjoined an extremely favorable structure of the political opportunities that has rarely challenged their 
demands, plans of expansion, and legitimacy. The only “negative case”, although further reflections need to 
be done on this label, is the disengagement of the Gaza settlements. As the authors mentioned on page 92, the 








Etzion Bloc  the movement has proceeded by creating “facts on the ground” with or without the support of 
government policies”. As they clarify “the government has in fact supported the movement both actively, 
through pro-settlement policies, and passively, by failing to implement anti-settlement policies even when these 
were the official position of the government” (p.92). Nevertheless, the strategy of the “facts on the ground” 
works only when the government is willing to accept that, in fact, when Palestinians build without building 
permits either in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem or in Israel itself, their houses, tents and shacks are 
immediately demolished (Joronen & Griffiths, 2019; Kedar, 2003; Meade, 2011). Additionally, the state of 
Israel itself has always relied on the strategy of the “facts on the ground”, the settler movement did not invent 
anything new. In this chapter, the authors provide an accurate picture of all the success of the movement in 
terms of numbers, geography, and legality but they also stress that they have not reached their ultimate goal: 
“bringing (all of) Eretz Yisrael under Israeli sovereignty, and more particularly, incorporating it formally 
within the boundaries of the State of Israel”(p. 92). Further comments need to be done on this passage. 
Proceeding throughout the book a natural question comes to mind: if the settler movement is so well integrated 
within the state of Israel, how much can it be considered an independent grassroots movement and not a mere 
more-radical arm of the state itself? The impressive support the movement enjoys, the massive resources they 
count on both from the Israeli state and US lobby groups, and virtual impunity most of its more radical activists 
can rely upon, seem to suggest that the state of Israel actually benefits from the presence of mass popular 
movement that guarantees constant lifeblood to the endeavour of annexing the West Bank. Additionally, strong 
popular support serves to bring legitimacy to carry on with something that goes against the international law 
as settlements do. Therefore, if the settler movement, despite all its resources and support did not manage to 
reach its final aim, it is probably because the State of Israel does not want to. Indeed, it is known that also 
among the Israeli economic, military and political leadership there is uncertainty on the concrete possibility of 
annexing the West Bank (Mnookin & Eiran, 2005; Gilead & Cohen, 2019). Bringing such a great number of 
Palestinians within the Israeli borders is unacceptable for most of the Israeli public, the other option is annexing 
the West Bank without giving Palestinians citizenship and civil and political rights –  which is very similar to 
the current situation considering that most of Palestinians are denied also basic human rights (Spangler, 2015; 
Human Rights Watch, 2021; World Report 2017, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2017). This second option 
would result in a widespread international outcry making the Israeli state even more eligible for the definition 
of Apartheid (Clarno, 2017; Falk & Tilley, 2017). Hence, Israeli elites have not decided yet and reached a 
consensus on how to proceed with the West Bank, the easiest way is maintaining the status quo through the 
help of the settlers: let them conquering as much land as possible, allowing them to implement extreme 
repertoire of actions towards Palestinians forcing them to move to bigger cities easier to keep under control 
without being directly responsible for the violation of international norms and agreements (B’Tselem, 2010; 
Nir, 2011; Zertal & Eldar, 2009).  
This is the same reason why it is not easy to consider the Gaza disengagement as a failure (chapter 6) for 
the settler movement. Sharon was perfectly aware that the security threat would have been too high and the 
protection of the settlers living within the Gaza Strip too expensive. Leaving the Gaza Strip transforming it 
into a de-facto open sky prison was more convenient than keeping settlers in a territory where, the 2006 
elections have subsequently shown, the Hamas movement was obtaining growing support by advocating for 
violent actions to liberate Palestine. Additionally, some other analysts have pointed at the fact that the Gaza 
disengagement was portrayed in such a traumatic way by the media also to prevent that something similar 
could have happened to settlers in the West Bank (Pappe, 2017). Such a positive Political Opportunity 
Structure, also indicated in the reconstruction of the positive case in chapter 5, the settlement of Ariel, makes 








Chapter 7 addresses the conclusions. The interpretation and readings of settler movement outcomes are 
surely very accurate; however, the considerations made above might be useful to enrich future studies on social 
movements’ outcomes. The Israeli settler movement is a case at the edge in the quite limited array of successful 
social movements now a day, and it is centrally important asking why. However, the conclusion they reach 
has largely been addressed and explored by the whole Amenta’s work in his political mediation model 
(Amenta, 2013). When the authors’ state that « When applied to the Israeli settler movement, this multifaceted 
approach showed how the organizational structure of that particular social movement, together with 
constraints and opportunities in the political system, have contributed to both its successes (e.g., Ariel) and 
failures (e.g., Gaza disengagement). In other words, our theoretical model suggests that individual and 
structural factors, both internal and external, shape social movement success in combination» (p.229). This is 
very true but also identified by Amenta (2013) when he says that strategies and organization, therefore internal 
factors, lead to outcomes only if they adapt to external conditions, therefore POS.  
The book unquestionably is an accurate reconstruction of the Israeli settler movement but it also shows 
some limitations. It can be considered the first in-depth study of the contemporary settler movements together 
with its ramifications abroad, providing a clear picture of a longstanding, radical right-wing social movement 
in a non-Western context. It is also an important contribution to those who want to study social movements 
from a more holistic perspective keeping into account all the movement’s components and repertoires. 
However, some biases and theoretical inaccuracies make it just a partial attempt towards the study of an aspect 
of social movements as important as the movement's outcomes. Bringing the spotlight on social movements' 
successes (although the normative implication of this term as shown above) is something very timing and on 
which much still needs to be said. 
As social movements’ scholars know and the authors recognize that «Social movements do not exist within 
a vacuum » (p. 33).  This is very true, however, the authors tend to omit, undermining part of their explanatory 
models, two very important contextual elements that played a pivotal role in determining the movement’s 
successes and failures. First, settlements are illegal according to international law and also according to the 
International Court of Justice and the Israeli Supreme Court itself has never addressed the issue of the 
settlements' legality. This is overtly mentioned only on page 62, but this is not a minor element. Settler 
movement leaders are aware of that, as well as the Israeli government, this is also why, as mentioned by the 
authors, they have to rely on strong pro-Israel lobbies all around the world, and in the US in particular. 
Additionally, as mentioned above, this is also, why the Israeli government needs the settler movement to justify 
something seen as a breach of international law from most of the international community.  
The second important inaccuracy the authors fail to deal with convincingly is how much the history of the 
state of Israel influences their claims and margin of action. The Zionist movement was a settler movement that 
subsequently, because of a series of favorable conditions, managed to establish a Jewish state in the land of 
Palestine previously under the British mandate. The authors are aware of that because they mention on page 
151, «One of the best-known settler actions is creating facts on the ground, that is, establishing new settlements 
or restabilizing settlements that were evacuated by the Israeli government. The tactic has been central to the 
settler movement since the early days of Gush Emunim, which in turn adopted the tactic from the early Zionist 
movement. » This does not come out of the blue and many Israeli citizens empathize with what the settlers are 
doing in the West Bank because this is what their ancestors have done since the 1880 (p. 41). The historical 
and consequently cultural roots of the Zionist settler colonial project (Rodinson, 1973; Sayegh, 1965) have 
certainly played an important role in how the movement framed its messages, developed its ideological basis 
and accessed the state institutions. This cannot be omit or kept at the margin while studying the Israeli settler 








or at least looking critically at the creation of their state, and this is something many Israelis are not willing to 
address yet but they will, eventually, if they want to find a solution to the conflict that includes both keeping 
settlers where they are and stopping violating Palestinians human, political and civil rights. The Israeli state 
aspires to gain more land since its creation, and it has engaged in several wars to obtain it, a movement that is 
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